If Netanyahu Goes, Will Israel’s Wars and Woes Really End?
Israelis head to the polls tomorrow, October 27. After three years of multi-front fighting that started with the horror of October 7, 2023, a lot of people are asking the same thing: if Bibi finally leaves the stage, do the wars just stop? Does the constant pressure ease up? Gaza, Lebanon, Iran, the West Bank mess — does it all quiet down? Short answer? No. Not really. Not in any clean, satisfying way.
Netanyahu has been the face of this era. He framed everything after October 7 as existential — preemptive action everywhere, buffer zones, no concessions. He’s pushed a kind of permanent readiness: hit threats early, hold ground, keep the pressure on. Some call it the Netanyahu doctrine. He’s sold it hard to his base. And yes, a big part of his political survival has been tied to keeping the sense of emergency alive. Wars have a way of delaying hard questions about responsibility for October 7, the hostages, the economy, the international isolation.
But here’s the thing people miss when they treat this as a one-man show. The security consensus in Israel shifted hard after October 7. Most Israelis still give the army high marks for how it fought. Trust in the political leadership is lower, sure. Polls have shown big majorities supporting the military effort even while questioning Netanyahu’s management. That doesn’t vanish the day he leaves office.
Gadi Eisenkot is the main alternative right now — former IDF chief, lost a son in Gaza, running as the serious, steady alternative. He’s not running on peace deals or pulling back. He’s talking competence, finishing the job against remaining threats, enforcing law in the West Bank, maybe a different tone with Washington. But the core assumptions — Iran remains the big danger, force is still the preferred tool, Palestinian statehood is not on the table anytime soon — those are shared across a wide stretch of the political map. Reuters and others have been saying the same thing for weeks: the election might change the leader, not the strategy.
Gaza has gone quieter in the big fighting sense after the ceasefires and the U.S.-backed arrangements, but Hamas hasn’t disappeared and reconstruction is tied to demilitarization demands that aren’t settled. Lebanon is similar — Hezbollah degraded, but not gone, and buffer zones are still a thing. Iran is the one that keeps coming back. Netanyahu has made toppling the regime or at least crippling its capabilities a personal mission. Even if he’s out, the next government will face an Iran that has shown it can absorb hits and keep its nuclear knowledge and regional networks. Analysts from Foreign Affairs to Al-Monitor keep pointing out that the strategic environment hardened after 2023. Short, decisive wars are harder. Attrition is the new normal for a lot of people in the security establishment.
Then there’s the deeper stuff that no election erases overnight. The Palestinian issue isn’t just Netanyahu’s creation. Settlements, the West Bank reality, the lack of a credible partner on the other side, the trauma of October 7 — these have moved Israeli public opinion rightward for years. A lot of Israelis simply don’t believe a two-state deal is realistic or safe right now. The far-right partners Netanyahu relied on pushed the maximalist line, but the skepticism about concessions is broader. And on the other side, Palestinian politics has its own failures and hardliners. Removing one Israeli prime minister doesn’t magically produce a negotiating partner or erase decades of mutual distrust.
The costs are real and they’re piling up. Hundreds of billions spent. International standing damaged. Domestic polarization deeper than ever — the ultra-Orthodox draft issue, the judicial fights, the economic strain. A new government under Eisenkot or some messy coalition would have to deal with all of that while still managing live threats. Some fronts might cool a bit under different management. Tone with the U.S. could shift. Maybe fewer dramatic escalations if Trump or whoever is in Washington pushes harder for wind-downs. But the underlying security dilemma doesn’t pack up and leave with Bibi.
People who want a clean break are hoping for more than leadership change can deliver. Netanyahu prolonged things for political reasons at times — that’s been widely reported and debated. Ending the war cleanly threatened his coalition and his own legal troubles. But the wars themselves grew out of real attacks, real rockets, real Iranian proxies, and a security failure on October 7 that shocked the country. The response became maximalist because the threat was seen as maximalist.
So if Netanyahu is gone after tomorrow’s vote, or after the inevitable coalition haggling that follows, expect some changes in style and priority. Maybe more focus on domestic accountability. Maybe tighter coordination with the U.S. on Iran. Possibly less pure politics in the timing of operations. What you shouldn’t expect is the end of the wars or the end of the woes. Israel’s security doctrine has hardened. The region’s balance hasn’t suddenly become friendly. The Palestinian question remains unresolved and explosive. Those problems are bigger than one man, even a man who’s dominated Israeli politics for as long as Netanyahu has.
Tomorrow’s vote is important. It could close one long chapter. It won’t rewrite the map.
Sources:
Foreign Affairs (Amos Harel, Sept 2026); Arab News analysis; Vox; Foreign Policy; Reuters (Oct 21, 2026); Times of Israel; Al-Monitor; Jerusalem Post; India Today (Oct 26, 2026); Atlantic Council; openDemocracy; various recent polling and campaign reporting.
If Netanyahu Goes, Will Israel’s Wars and Woes Really End?
Israelis head to the polls tomorrow, October 27. After three years of multi-front fighting that started with the horror of October 7, 2023, a lot of people are asking the same thing: if Bibi finally leaves the stage, do the wars just stop? Does the constant pressure ease up? Gaza, Lebanon, Iran, the West Bank mess — does it all quiet down? Short answer? No. Not really. Not in any clean, satisfying way.
Netanyahu has been the face of this era. He framed everything after October 7 as existential — preemptive action everywhere, buffer zones, no concessions. He’s pushed a kind of permanent readiness: hit threats early, hold ground, keep the pressure on. Some call it the Netanyahu doctrine. He’s sold it hard to his base. And yes, a big part of his political survival has been tied to keeping the sense of emergency alive. Wars have a way of delaying hard questions about responsibility for October 7, the hostages, the economy, the international isolation.
But here’s the thing people miss when they treat this as a one-man show. The security consensus in Israel shifted hard after October 7. Most Israelis still give the army high marks for how it fought. Trust in the political leadership is lower, sure. Polls have shown big majorities supporting the military effort even while questioning Netanyahu’s management. That doesn’t vanish the day he leaves office.
Gadi Eisenkot is the main alternative right now — former IDF chief, lost a son in Gaza, running as the serious, steady alternative. He’s not running on peace deals or pulling back. He’s talking competence, finishing the job against remaining threats, enforcing law in the West Bank, maybe a different tone with Washington. But the core assumptions — Iran remains the big danger, force is still the preferred tool, Palestinian statehood is not on the table anytime soon — those are shared across a wide stretch of the political map. Reuters and others have been saying the same thing for weeks: the election might change the leader, not the strategy.
Gaza has gone quieter in the big fighting sense after the ceasefires and the U.S.-backed arrangements, but Hamas hasn’t disappeared and reconstruction is tied to demilitarization demands that aren’t settled. Lebanon is similar — Hezbollah degraded, but not gone, and buffer zones are still a thing. Iran is the one that keeps coming back. Netanyahu has made toppling the regime or at least crippling its capabilities a personal mission. Even if he’s out, the next government will face an Iran that has shown it can absorb hits and keep its nuclear knowledge and regional networks. Analysts from Foreign Affairs to Al-Monitor keep pointing out that the strategic environment hardened after 2023. Short, decisive wars are harder. Attrition is the new normal for a lot of people in the security establishment.
Then there’s the deeper stuff that no election erases overnight. The Palestinian issue isn’t just Netanyahu’s creation. Settlements, the West Bank reality, the lack of a credible partner on the other side, the trauma of October 7 — these have moved Israeli public opinion rightward for years. A lot of Israelis simply don’t believe a two-state deal is realistic or safe right now. The far-right partners Netanyahu relied on pushed the maximalist line, but the skepticism about concessions is broader. And on the other side, Palestinian politics has its own failures and hardliners. Removing one Israeli prime minister doesn’t magically produce a negotiating partner or erase decades of mutual distrust.
The costs are real and they’re piling up. Hundreds of billions spent. International standing damaged. Domestic polarization deeper than ever — the ultra-Orthodox draft issue, the judicial fights, the economic strain. A new government under Eisenkot or some messy coalition would have to deal with all of that while still managing live threats. Some fronts might cool a bit under different management. Tone with the U.S. could shift. Maybe fewer dramatic escalations if Trump or whoever is in Washington pushes harder for wind-downs. But the underlying security dilemma doesn’t pack up and leave with Bibi.
People who want a clean break are hoping for more than leadership change can deliver. Netanyahu prolonged things for political reasons at times — that’s been widely reported and debated. Ending the war cleanly threatened his coalition and his own legal troubles. But the wars themselves grew out of real attacks, real rockets, real Iranian proxies, and a security failure on October 7 that shocked the country. The response became maximalist because the threat was seen as maximalist.
So if Netanyahu is gone after tomorrow’s vote, or after the inevitable coalition haggling that follows, expect some changes in style and priority. Maybe more focus on domestic accountability. Maybe tighter coordination with the U.S. on Iran. Possibly less pure politics in the timing of operations. What you shouldn’t expect is the end of the wars or the end of the woes. Israel’s security doctrine has hardened. The region’s balance hasn’t suddenly become friendly. The Palestinian question remains unresolved and explosive. Those problems are bigger than one man, even a man who’s dominated Israeli politics for as long as Netanyahu has.
Tomorrow’s vote is important. It could close one long chapter. It won’t rewrite the map.
Sources:
Foreign Affairs (Amos Harel, Sept 2026); Arab News analysis; Vox; Foreign Policy; Reuters (Oct 21, 2026); Times of Israel; Al-Monitor; Jerusalem Post; India Today (Oct 26, 2026); Atlantic Council; openDemocracy; various recent polling and campaign reporting.
@Rohit Manral
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